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This paper takes as given that the goal of economic development 
incentives (EDIs) is to improve the economic welfare of the citizens of 
a particular geographic area.  This paper does not attempt to answer the 
question of whether EDIs, in their many forms, have in fact succeeded 
in improving economic welfare, either in absolute terms or above 
where economic welfare would have been in the absence of the EDI.  
This paper takes the current state of EDI policy and implementation as 
given, and focuses the analysis instead on the economic and legal 
issues associated with open versus sealed bids.  This paper reviews the 
different approaches taken by various jurisdictions regarding the 
openness of the bidding process and explores the sometimes 
counterintuitive impact of making the bidding process more open and 
transparent on the creation of economic wealth.  The specific 
experiences of the Boeing, Dell, Google and Caterpillar EDIs are used 
to illustrate the analysis.  
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I.  OVERVIEW OF STATE JOB CREATION TAX INCENTIVES 
 
State and local leaders across the country have continued to face 
strong pressure from constituents and pundits to create jobs during the 
prolonged job decline, which has affected a broad array of industries.  
Many states are faced with the loss of traditional manufacturing jobs.  
Facing these losses, states have turned to economic development 
incentives to spur job growth. 
North Carolina and South Carolina have emerged as national 
competitors to bring new companies to their respective states using a 
mix of state and local EDIs.
1
  North Carolina has long battled the loss 
of its traditional manufacturing jobs in the textile and furniture 
industries.   Recently, state leaders in North Carolina have focused 
much of the state's large EDI packages towards technology 
companies—seen as a shift away from manufacturing.  South Carolina, 
while also targeting technology companies, has landed several high-
profile manufacturers with EDIs, including BMW Manufacturing 
Company
2
 and The Boeing Company.
3
  North Carolina has shown a 
willingness to compete for large manufacturers with their neighbor to 
the south.  In 2010, both North Carolina and South Carolina submitted 
bids to heavy manufacturer Caterpillar, Inc., which ultimately chose 
Forsyth County, North Carolina over a site in South Carolina.
4
 
Both states combine county or municipal incentives with state-
level incentives to create bids that often climb into the hundreds of 
millions of dollars.
5
  Local incentives take many forms, including tax 
                                                 
1 See generally Sherry L. Jarrell, Gary Shoesmith & J. Neal Robbins, Law 
and Economics of Regulating Local Economic Development Incentives, 41 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 805 (2006). 
2 Jack Lyne, New South Carolina Incentives Spur BMW's $400M, 400-Job 
Expansion, SITE SELECTION, Sept. 28, 2009, 
http://www.siteselection.com/ssinsider/incentive/ti0210.htm. 
3 David Slade & Katy Stech, Boeing's Whopping Incentives,  POST & 
COURIER, Jan. 17, 2010, 
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2010/jan/17/boeings-whopping-
incentives/. 
4 Richard Craver, Caterpillar to Expand Its Operations in Sanford, 
WINSTON-SALEM J., Aug. 6, 2010, 
http://www2.journalnow.com/business/2010/aug/06/caterpillar-to-expand-its-
operations-in-sanford-ar-393666/. 
5 Slade & Stech, supra note 3. 
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rate reductions, refunds, grants, and property improvements.
6
  State 
EDIs in North Carolina and South Carolina arise from similar statutory 
mandates and delegated authorities.  In North Carolina and South 
Carolina, like many other states, the state-level EDIs can be grouped 
into two predominant categories: job-based EDI and infrastructure EDI. 
Both North Carolina and South Carolina governments operate in 
a traditional, three-prong system consisting of a supreme court, 
governor, and bi-cameral legislature.
7
  Both states have adopted 
freedom of information legislation (FOIA).
8
  The question presented 
here is whether the general notion that "transparency in government is 
good" is truly beneficial in an EDI bidding process.  The first step is to 
examine the available incentives in each state and the information that 
is made public during the bidding process. 
 
A.  NORTH CAROLINA 
 
North Carolina has two primary EDI programs.  The first, "Tax 
Credits for Growing Businesses" (TCGB), contains incentives for job 
creation and for property investment.
9
  The N.C. General Assembly 
created this program in 2006.
10
  The purpose of this legislation was to 
replace the William S. Lee Quality Jobs and Business Expansion Act 
with more narrowly-tailored credits that would create jobs and increase 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Irwin Speizer, The China Trade: The State Lands the 
Headquarters of a Company from a Country Many Tar Heel Manufacturers 
Love to Hate , BUS. N.C., May 2006, at 36 (discussing North Carolina’s use of 
direct grants, state tax credits, training assistance, and direct incentives from 
county governments to lure Lenovo to the Research Triangle area). 
7 For North Carolina, the structure of the state government is described in 
the N.C. Constitution, NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION, N.C. GEN. 
ASSEMB., 
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/legislation/constitution/ncconstitution.html (last 
visited June 28, 2011).  For South Carolina’s structure of state government, see 
the S.C. Constitution, SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION, S.C. LEG. ONLINE, 
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/scconstitution/scconst.htm (last visited June 28, 
2011). 
8 Public Records Law, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132 (2010); Freedom of 
Information Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-10 (2010). 
9 Tax Credits for Growing Businesses, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-129.80 
(2010). 
10 The governor signed this bill into law on August 17, 2006.  H. B. 2170, 
2005-2006 Sess. (N.C. 2006). 
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business investment in the state.
11
  Before the TCGB program, the 
William S. Lee Act regulated a tiered incentive system in North 
Carolina, which favored rural areas over more developed counties.  
From a jobs perspective, a tier-1 county (wealthiest type of county) 
would receive $500 in incentives per job created, while a tier-5 county 
(poorest type of county) would receive $12,500 in incentives for the 
same job.
12
   
The second program is the One North Carolina Fund ("One 
NC"), formerly the Governor's Industrial Recruitment Competitiveness 
Fund.
13
  The One NC program promotes the installation and purchase 





B.  SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
Like North Carolina, South Carolina has job-creation and 
infrastructure incentives.  There are three jobs incentives: the 
traditional annual job tax credit and exemptions,
15
 the annual small 
business job tax credit,
16




South Carolina also promotes infrastructure and physical plant 
investment with targeted credits.
18
  The state uses a fairly complex 
system of fees-in-lieu of property taxes; it also provides credits in the 
form of sales tax exemptions, grants, and loans for land acquisition.  
South Carolina has also offered credits for worker training and 
relocation, water and sewer infrastructure, site preparation, and road or 
rail improvement.  
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 WILLIAM SCHWEKE & FRANK DISILVESTRO, CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., 
BUSINESS INCENTIVES AND NORTH CAROLINA'S TIER 1 COUNTIES: HAVE THEY 
WORKED? (Dec. 2008), 
http://cfed.org/assets/pdfs/BusinessIncentives_Tier1Counties[1].pdf. 
13 One North Carolina Fund, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-437.70 (2010). 
14 ONE NORTH CAROLINA FUND, N.C. DEP’T COMMERCE, 
http://www.nccommerce.com/en/BusinessServices/LocateYourBusiness/WhyN
C/Incentives/OneNorthCarolinaFund/ (last visited June 28, 2011). 
15 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-3360(C)(1) (2010). 
16 § 12-6-3360(C)(2). 
17 § 12-6-3362. 
18 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-14-60 (2010) (This investment tax credit 
is calculated as a percentage of the total aggregate basis for the particular 
property.). 
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C.  SEALED VERSUS OPEN BIDDING 
 
Both North Carolina and South Carolina have adopted specific 
exemptions from their respective freedom of information and public 
records legislation.  In North Carolina, no disclosure is required under a 
public records request until an EDI is awarded or rejected.
19
  To the 
contrary, in South Carolina, "confidential proprietary information 
provided to a public body for economic development or contract 
negotiations purposes is not required to be disclosed" under FOIA even 
after an EDI has been awarded or rejected.
20
  Such a distinction means 
that North Carolina is considered more “open” in its bidding process 
than South Carolina.
21
  It is also important to note that cost-benefit data 
relating to EDI packages are not exempt from disclosure under FOIA in 
either North Carolina
22
 or South Carolina.
23
  Nevertheless, the quality 
of cost-benefit analyses is not regulated and varies greatly. 
 
II.  RECENT EDI ACTIVITY IN NORTH CAROLINA AND SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
It is of interest to compare the bidding activity in open versus 
closed states, particularly when they bid against each other for the same 
company.  North Carolina and South Carolina have bid against each 
other with numerous EDI packages over the past decade.  While North 
Carolina’s policy requires that incentive offers for companies be made 
publicly available, policymakers in South Carolina, including (former) 
Gov. Mark Sanford and House Speaker Bobby Harrell, have advocated 
                                                 
19 N.C. GEN STAT.  § 132-6(d) (2010). 
20 S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(a)(5)(c) (2010). 
21 In a December 2010 survey grading states on how well they disclose 
their EDIs online, Good Jobs First, a nonprofit nonpartisan research center in 
Washington, DC, gave South Carolina a score of zero, the lowest possible 
score.  In comparison, North Carolina scored 69.  Philip Mattera, et al., Show 
Us the Subsidies, GOOD JOBS FIRST (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/showusthesubsidies. 
22 N.C. GEN STAT.  § 132-1.11 (2010). 
23 S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-55 (2010). It is worth noting, however, that this 
section only requires disclosure either after the offered incentive is accepted or 
when the project is publicly announced, whichever occurs later. 
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to keep the bidding process sealed in an effort to attract major 
employers by keeping their business plans private.
24
  
South Carolina alone has allocated roughly $2.5 billion in 
incentive packages from fiscal year 1999 to 2008, resulting in 11% 
annual growth in gross state product (GSP) compared to a national 
average of almost 15% growth.
25
  In response, at least in part, to this 
lack of growth, some South Carolina legislators have called for 
revisions to the current regulations on incentive offerings.  Senator 
Tom Davis drafted legislation—S. 206, The Economic Incentive 
Transparency Act—which would radically transform the EDI process 
in South Carolina.  According to Senator Davis, “There’s really no 
formal due diligence on these incentives to objectively analyze their 
public costs and benefits . . . all we do is mouth the words ‘it creates 
jobs’ and the analysis doesn’t really go beyond that.”
26
 
For the purpose of the analysis in this paper, North Carolina’s 
EDI bidding process is considered more open than South Carolina’s.  
Note that, in this context, this does not signify a policy of complete 
transparency, but rather a policy that requires relatively more 
information to be disclosed during the bidding process.  Four cases, in 
particular, highlight the nature of the controversy over whether 
“openness” helps or hurts a state’s efforts to bring a target company 
home.  The level of economic wealth in these cases ranged from $50 
million to upwards of $1 billion, demonstrating just how much 
taxpayer funds are at stake and how essential is further analysis on the 
effects of transparency within EDI bidding processes.  
 
A.  TOM DAVIS, S. 206, HIGHLIGHTS OF BILL 
 
Senator Davis’ proposed bill calls for not only significant 
changes in the nature and timeliness of disclosure of EDIs during the 
                                                 
24 Ben Szobody, Sweet Incentives Can Leave Sour Taste, N.C. INST. FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.ncicl.org/article/363 (last 
visited June 28, 2011).  S.C. House Speaker Bobby Harrell called North 
Carolina's unilateral disclosure of incentive details "not real bright" and 
postulated that such disclosures enable other states to make better offers. 
25 Simon Wong & Jameson Taylor, A Review of Total State Spending, Part 
II: An Effective Spending Cap for South Carolina, S.C. POL’Y COUNCIL (Dec. 
20, 2010), http://www.scpolicycouncil.com/pdf/1215budgetpartii.pdf. 
26 Eric K. Ward,  Bill Proposes Transparency in Incentives, NERVE (Dec. 
22, 2010), reprinted in BEFORE IT’S NEWS (Jan. 24, 2011, 08:44), 
http://beforeitsnews.com/story/373/283/Bill_Proposes_Transparency_in_Incent
ives.html. 
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bidding process, but also for radical changes in the way economic value 
is assigned.
27
  Some of the highlights of the bill include new 
requirements such as a cost-benefit analysis by an independent 
economist for incentives that exceed $100,000 over a five-year period, 
a clawback provision should the company not meet expectations, and a 
cap on subsidies where the cost per job created exceeds the average per 
capita income within the state (approximately $31,800 in 2009).
28
  The 
proposed bill requires public notice and a hearing for all incentive 
packages valued at over $100,000.
29
  The bill also requires that a cost-
benefit analysis be communicated to the general public through the 
Department of Commerce’s website, as well as to the general media 
through email.
30
  The bill also describes in detail a process by which 
information concerning the transaction could be made accessible to the 
public without also revealing the target firm’s trade secrets and 
personal data.  The South Carolina Senate referred this bill to the 





B.  ARGUMENTS FOR/AGAINST TRANSPARENCY 
 
A major issue for all officials associated with the EDI bidding 
process is whether taxpayer funds are being utilized in the most 
appropriate manner.  Historically, South Carolina officials have 
advocated a more closed process, citing the advantages to potential 
target firms.  In North Carolina, a commentator has also recognized the 
potential disadvantages of a transparent process:  
State officials always have insisted that they have to 
do economic development deals in secret, lest they 
scare off would-be investors and hurt our chances 
against other states. . . .  Unlike South Carolina and 
Alabama, North Carolina has a law that requires 
incentive offers to be made public, in real time.
32
  
                                                 
27 S. 206, 2011-2012 Leg., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011) 
28 Id. at §§ 12-66-120 to -130 (2011). 
29 Id. at § 12-66-140 (2011).  
30 Id. 
31 S. JOURNAL, 2011-2012 Leg., 119th Sess. 1-206 (2011).  
32 Op-Ed., Secrecy Drives Up Cost of Economic Development, N.C. INST. 
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Aug. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Secrecy Drives Up 
Cost], http://www.ncicl.org/article/369. 
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North Carolina’s historic corporate income tax structure consists 
of a flat 6.9% rate in comparison to South Carolina’s 5% rate.
33
  
However, the governor’s new budget will reduce North Carolina’s 
corporate income tax rate to 4.9%, the lowest in the Southeast and third 
lowest in the nation.
34
  This variable has influenced the bidding process 
in terms of competitive interstate bids in order to entice companies to 
receive the most beneficial packages possible.  There is a possibility 
that the change in the economic climate within North Carolina, with 
such a significant adjustment to its income tax structure, will change 
how the state chooses to offer EDIs.  
A recent study of 338 deals in North Carolina involving business 
incentives offered between 2001 and 2008 showed that the median 
value of incentive packages was at least $200,000; yet the average 
value of North Carolina incentive packages was $2 million, skewed by 
a few outliers valued at over $10 million.
35
  Schweke and Taylor 
highlighted the effects of a handful of very large, local incentive 
packages and warned that interstate bidding wars may destroy value 
through over-paying in the terms of the deal.
36
  In three of the 
following cases, it appears that North Carolina provided considerably 
larger packages than other states involved in competitive bidding.  
While there has been research in the academic literature 
concerning the impact of EDIs, there is a lack of research regarding the 
effects of a transparent bidding process on these deals.  The following 
four cases were selected based on size, publicity, and abundant 
competition among states and localities for investment and jobs.  Both 
pundits and vocal state representatives have acknowledged that North 
Carolina is relatively more transparent than South Carolina in their 
disclosures on EDI.
37
  Both states have advocates and opponents for 
their current strategies, and these four particular cases have served as 
fodder for each line of reasoning.  
Dell, Google, Caterpillar, and Boeing are major corporations that 
                                                 
33 State Corporate Income Tax Rates, 2000-2011, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 1, 
2011), http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/230.html.  
34 Matt Young, Governor Presents Surprise Tax Relief for North Carolina 
Businesses, CARY CITIZEN, Feb. 20, 2011, 
http://carycitizen.com/2011/02/20/governor-presents-surprise-tax-relief-for-
north-carolina-businesses/. 
35 WILLIAM SCHWEKE & BRIAN TAYLOR, CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., LOCAL 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES IN NORTH CAROLINA (Dec. 16, 2008), 
http://cfed.org/assets/pdfs/LocalIncentives_12-16-08[1].pdf. 
36 Id. 
37 Secrecy Drives Up Cost, supra note 32. 
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have sought to relocate in the Southeast and, thus, have stirred up 
competition for their investment.  In all four cases, states and counties 
with different disclosure policies offered major EDIs in order to 
convince these companies to select their locations, and thus may offer 
some insight into the interaction between EDI policy and the economic 
outcomes.  According to the 2011 rankings of Fortune 500 companies, 
each corporation is ranked within the top one hundred firms within the 
U.S.
38
  At the time of this publication, these four firms employ over 
390,000 people and had revenue of $204.06 billion in the past twelve 
months.
39
  Each of these deals was highly publicized, not only for the 
implication of the job growth or the value of their EDI packages but 
also because a major corporation with powerful name brand recognition 
would now be part of the local economy.  Google and Dell are 
important case studies from the high-tech industry because each 
company eventually accepted EDI packages in North Carolina, and 
their bidding processes complement each other.  Additionally, 
Caterpillar and Boeing offer rich examples from the manufacturing 
sector of the need for research on the effects of transparency.  
 
1.  DELL 
 
Dell was the recipient of a highly-publicized EDI for a computer 
manufacturing plant in Winston-Salem in 2004.
40
  The deal was highly 
sought after and involved tax breaks worth up to $277 million in 
exchange for Dell’s promise to provide 1,500 jobs that paid $14 an 
hour.  This suggests that the state was willing to pay $185,000 per job 
as part of the incentive package at a time when the per-capita income in 
                                                 
38 FORTUNE 500, CNNMONEY (May 23, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/full_list/.  
39 Google Inc. (GOOG): Profile, YAHOO! FIN., 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=GOOG+Profile (follow “Key Statistics” 
hyperlink) (last visited June 28, 2011); Caterpillar Inc. (CAT): Profile, YAHOO! 
FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=CAT+Profile (follow “Key Statistics” 
hyperlink) (last visited June 28, 2011); Boeing Co. (BA): Profile, YAHOO! FIN., 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=BA+Profile (follow “Key Statistics” 
hyperlink) (last visited June 28, 2011); Dell Inc. (DELL): Profile, YAHOO! FIN., 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=DELL+Profile (follow “Key Statistics” 
hyperlink) (last visited June 28, 2011) (summing the “Full Time Employees” 
and “Revenue” for the trailing twelve months as of April 29, 2011 for all four 
companies).   
40 See Jarrell, Shoesmith & Robbins, supra note 1. 
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North Carolina was only $29,246.
41
  Instead, only four years after the 
plant’s grand opening, 905 workers lost their jobs when Dell 
announced its intentions to close the plant.
42
  The plant never fulfilled 
its promise to employ 1,500 workers.
43
  
North Carolina was engaged in a bidding war with the state of 
Virginia for the Dell factory from the onset of the location selection 
process.  Virginia privately offered only $30-$37 million; nevertheless, 
Forsyth County, North Carolina offered Dell an EDI package worth 
$240 million and $37 million in state and local taxes, respectively.
44
  
N.C. Representative Paul Luebke expressed frustration when Virginia’s 
bid was finally revealed and worried that “North Carolina was 
bargaining against itself” in reference to the interstate bidding that went 
on.  Mike Randle, publisher of Southern Business & Development, 
argued that “North Carolina had to overpay for Dell because it had 
missed out on every ‘signature deal’ for the last 10 years.”
45
  While 
Dell was able to pay back the majority of the incentives, the $18 
million in public money spent to help Dell prepare for the opening of 




2.  GOOGLE 
 
In 2007, North Carolina offered a controversial EDI package to 
bring the Google data center to Caldwell County.
47
  The package was 
valued at $212 million in tax cuts, infrastructure improvements, and 
                                                 
41 See David G. Lenze & Kathy Albetski, News Release: State Personal 
Income, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALAYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE (Mar. 28, 
2005), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/spi/2005/spi0305.htm. 
42 See Emery P. Dalesio, Millions Spent Luring Dell to NC Can’t Be 
Recouped, STREET (Oct. 9, 2009), 
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10609805/millions-spent-luring-luring -dell-to-
nc-cant-be-recouped.html. 
43 See id. 
44 See Paul Chesser, Magazine: NC Overpaid for Dell, CAROLINA J. 
ONLINE (Jan. 14, 2005), 
http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html?id=2107. 
45 Paul Chesser, Did NC Overpay for Dell Plant?, CAROLINA J., Apr. 2005, 
at 5, available at 
http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/cjPrintEdition/carolina_journal.2005.04.pdf. 
46 Dalesio, supra note 42. 
47 See Cullen Browder, Google Incentives Fuel Debate About the Tactic, 
WRAL.COM (Feb. 9, 2007), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1197713. 
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other incentives over thirty years in an effort to bring 210 jobs to a 
community that had lost over 2,100 jobs in just three years.
48
 
Transparency was a major issue from the onset of the transaction.  
Google conducted a bidding process by dispatching an employee to 
gauge interest among different states and counties without informing 
state officials which company he was representing.  Rhett Weiss, one of 
Google’s site negotiators, required that each county sign a strict 
confidentiality agreement and did not inform participants in the highly-




The local Caldwell County portion of the $212 million Google 
deal was estimated to be as high as $165 million.
50
  Part of the rationale 
behind the Caldwell County deal was a desperate effort to outbid South 
Carolina.  “Some news reports portrayed a direct, one-on-one 
competition between North Carolina and South Carolina, which 
implied one of the states would lose out.  In reality, according to 
Google officials, 12 locations in seven states [were] under 
consideration . . . .”
51
  In return for “a 100 percent waiver on business 
property taxes and an 80 percent waiver of real estate property taxes for 
the next 30 years,” Google planned to bring 210 jobs paying 
approximately $48,000 a year to Caldwell County at a cost of over $1 
million per job.
52
  Many critics of the deal felt that Google executives 
took advantage of Lenoir and Caldwell County officials through intense 
secrecy throughout the bidding process.
53 
 
                                                 
48 Nanette Byrnes & Coleman Cowan, The High Cost of Wooing Google, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 23, 2007), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_30/b4043066.htm. 
49 Id. 
50 Jonathan Q. Morgan, Using Economic Development Incentives: For 
Better or Worse, POPULAR GOV’T, Winter 2009, at 16, 
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/article3_13.pdf. 
51 Paul Chesser, Did SC Get a Better Google Deal?, CAROLINA J. ONLINE 
(Apr. 6, 2007), 
http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html?id=3993. 
52 See John Dayberry, Based on Google Experience, Caldwell Officials 
Say Apple Will Be Sweet Deal, HICKORY DAILY REC., July 12, 2009, 
http://www2.hickoryrecord.com/news/2009/jul/12/based-google-experience-
caldwell-officials-say-app-ar-90040/. 
53 Bob Orr, a former North Carolina Supreme Court justice who was 
running for governor, spoke publicly against Google’s negotiation tactics.  "It's 
simply unconscionable from an ethics standpoint for this company to go in 
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Debate continued when Google announced that it planned to 
build an additional $600 million data center in Berkeley County, near 
Charleston, S.C.  Berkeley County appeared to get a much better deal 
than Caldwell County; a Google spokesman said the company planned 
to “pay $58.8 million over the 30 years ($1.96 million per year) in real 
and personal property taxes through South Carolina's FILOT 
program."
54
   
It was recently announced that Caldwell County and the City of 
Lenoir would receive $2 million in tax revenue because Google 
delayed its request for tax rebates due to its failure to provide the 
minimum number of jobs listed in its contract.
55
  One Google official 
stated that the company would not have considered relocating to North 
Carolina or South Carolina without the lure of large incentive packages.  
He said that without EDIs “the whole part of our economic analysis 




3.  CATERPILLAR 
 
Caterpillar recently announced that it elected to build a new 
equipment plant in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.  The decision was 
a result of aggressive bidding between Winston-Salem; Spartanburg, 
South Carolina; and Montgomery, Alabama.  After an intense bidding 
process where South Carolina and Alabama were privy to North 
Carolina’s public offers in advance of the official bid, Caterpillar 




                                                                                                 
from this very unfair bargaining position . . . .  These are business decisions by 
the smartest businesspeople in the world, and it's just exploiting a desperate 
town."  Byrnes and Cowan, supra note 48. 
54 Chesser, supra note 51.  South Carolina’s FILOT (fee-in-lieu of 
property taxes) program enables counties to offer reduced property tax rates to 
companies that promise significant capital investment and job creation.  These 
reductions can be substantial, 10.5% to 6% or even lower, which can translate 
to massive long-term savings for a company. 
55 See Paul Teague, Google Gives Up 2008 Incentives, NEWS-TOPIC 
(Lenoir, N.C.), May 1, 2008, 
http://www2.nccommerce.com/eclipsfiles/18921.pdf.  
56 Chesser, supra note 51. 
57 Szobody, supra note 24. 
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As part of the transaction, Caterpillar was projected to employ 
392 full-time and 118 contract workers in the new $426 million plant.
58
  
The facility is 850,000 square feet and is expected to pay an average 
salary of $40,482 a year.
59
  Considering the $40 million in incentives 
($17 million to be provided by the state and the remaining $23 million 
to be provided by Forsyth County), North Carolina effectively paid 
roughly $78,431 per job.  Bob Orr, a former N.C. Supreme Court 
justice and the executive director of the N.C. Institute for Constitutional 
Law, voiced his frustration on the matter: “If the whole process was on 
eBay, we'd save the states millions of dollars.”
60
  He further explained 
that he felt as if North Carolina was being taken advantage of on a 
continuing basis.
61
  “If you look at the budget holes state and local 




Orr is not the only state official who feels that way.  Bobby 
Harrell, the South Carolina House Speaker, expressed that North 
Carolina’s decision to be transparent and reveal parts of their incentive 
offerings provides other states with an unfair advantage.
63
  South 
Carolina and Alabama had the opportunity to analyze North Carolina’s 
bid and assess their own offerings without reciprocating any 
information.  The simple act of having multiple entities in a 
competitive bidding process with different policies over transparency 
creates a situation where states have the potential to overpay in order to 
increase the likelihood that their bid is selected.  
This process seems to destroy value for taxpayers by including 
other states just for the sake of competition.  The Mayor of 
Montgomery, Alabama, Todd Strange, told The Montgomery 
                                                 
58 Richard Craver, Caterpillar Era Underway in Winston-Salem, 
WINSTON-SALEM J., Nov. 12, 2010, 
http://www2.journalnow.com/business/2010/nov/12/caterpillar-era-under-way-
winston-salem-ground-bro-ar-531889/. 
59 Caterpillar Officially Announces Winston-Salem Project, NEWS & 
RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), July 30, 2010, http://www.news-
record.com/content/2010/07/30/article/reports_caterpillar_chooses_winston_sal
em. 
60 Szobody, supra note 24. 
61 David Bracken, Winston-Salem Lands Caterpillar, CHARLOTTE 




63 Szobody, supra note 24. 
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Advertiser in the weeks leading up to the final decision that he did not 





unclear whether Montgomery or Spartanburg, South Carolina ever 
intended to enter bids even near the $40 million package offered by 
Winston-Salem, demonstrating the potential inefficiencies that arise 
when transparency can act as an advantage or disadvantage.  Orr 
commented, “That is all part of the game—using the competition to 




4.  BOEING 
 
In late 2009, South Carolina announced that Boeing would be 
constructing a 787 Dreamliner assembly line in North Charleston and 
creating 3,800 jobs in the process.
66
  South Carolina officials and its 
then-Governor, Mark Sanford, desperately sought to land the Boeing 
project, as the state felt that it had missed an opportunity with the 
company during a competitive bidding process in 2003.  Many 
reporters eagerly compared Boeing to other “crown jewel” companies 
of the state, such as BMW, located in Greer, South Carolina.
67
  
The recent Boeing plant was yet another opportunity for North 
Carolina and South Carolina to compete in the same bidding process.  
Back in 2003, the two states bid against each other for the first 
assembly line for the 787 airplane, but Boeing decided to build its plant 
in Everett, Washington.
68
  While North Carolina never officially 
released any information on the 2009 bid, it was widely rumored at the 
time that South Carolina would be bidding against North Carolina.  
This environment marked a stark contrast from previous bidding wars 
                                                 
64 Craver, supra note 58. 
65 Szobody, supra note 24. 
66 Mike Randle, Our Take on Boeing’s South Carolina Deal, S. BUS. & 
DEV., http://www.sb-
d.com/Features/OurTakeonBoeingsSouthCarolinaDeal/tabid/308/Default.aspx 
(last visited June 28, 2011). 
67 Dominique Cantelme, South Carolina, Already Home to More than 100 
Aerospace-related Companies, Lands a Crown Jewel: Boeing’s Second 787 
Dreamliner Plant, BUS. FACILITIES, Jan. 1, 2010, 
http://www.businessfacilities.com/articles/2009-economic-development-deal-
of-the-year-awards.php.  Business Facilities Magazine gave South Carolina and 
the Boeing project its 2009 Economic Deal of the Year Gold Award.  
68 Alan M. Wolf, N.C. Officials Remain Quiet on Boeing as Washington 
Wooing Intensifies, NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Oct. 14, 2009), 
http://blogs.newsobserver.com/business/nc-officials-remain-quiet-on-boeing-
as-washington-wooing-intensifies. 
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between these two states.  Historically, South Carolina was privy to 
EDI information that North Carolina disclosed prior to the company 
choosing its final location.  However, the high stakes of the Boeing 
project reversed the roles of each state during the bidding process.  The 
rumor of competition with North Carolina may have drastically 
impacted the monetary value of South Carolina’s bid in its effort to 
ensure that the assembly line was built in North Charleston. 
A significant amount of controversy has arisen over the Boeing 
process, specifically there have been complaints regarding the lack of 
disclosure of financial analysis in the months following the 
announcement.  The sheer size of the incentives made the offering one 
of the largest EDI packages that the state had ever offered, at a value of 
$450 million for the company to create 3,800 jobs and invest over $750 
million in a seven-year period.
69
  The package was a result of a hard-
fought bidding war with Everett, Washington for the second time in 
less than a decade, providing additional motivation for South Carolina 
to make a successful bid. 
After the initial announcement, many citizens and policymakers 
within the state were excited at the prospect of having such a large 
corporation within the aerospace industry that could provide the state 
with several thousand jobs.  Yet, within months of the opening 
announcement, one local newspaper reported that the incentive package 
may be worth as much as $900 million, twice what was originally 
broadcasted when Boeing accepted the EDIs.
70
  The Post and Courier 
performed its own cost-benefit analysis of the EDIs, which had been 
valued at approximately $450 million.  The newspaper determined that 
the lower valuation did not factor in property and sales tax breaks that 
Boeing would not have had to pay if it had not chosen North 
Charleston as its location.  By almost any measure, the EDIs alone will 
be sufficient to fully reimburse Boeing for the company’s $750 million 
investment required to build the plant in North Charleston.  A cost-
benefit analysis, which was performed in preparing the package, 
estimated that for every $1 spent in taxpayer funds, the state and 
community of North Charleston would receive $14.
71
  Many of the 
officials involved with the deal attempted to deny claims that the $450 
                                                 
69 John McDermott & Yvonne Wenger, Boeing Lands in North 
Charleston, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Oct. 28, 2009, 
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2009/oct/28/boeing-picks-charleston/.  
70 Slade & Stech, supra note 3.  
71 Id. 
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million figure was ever released and argued that the benefits of Boeing 
far outweighed the costs of bringing the corporation into the state.
72
  
According to these figures, it appears that South Carolina was 
willing to spend approximately $200,000 or more in taxpayer funds per 
Boeing job.  This large sum and the subsequent attempts by officials to 
quell criticism over the deal was part of the motivation for Senator 
Davis’s proposed S. 206 bill.  The South Carolina Department of 
Commerce believed that this EDI represented an investment that would 
create the proposed 3,800 jobs at the Boeing factory, along with 5,971 
jobs indirectly associated with the construction of the infrastructure and 




With the lack of disclosure through FOIA concerning the true 
value of the EDI package, it is difficult to ascertain whether the $900 
million is an accurate value for the offering.  Still, the discrepancies in 
value, lack of prompt disclosure, and perceived secrecy all highlight 
issues that may arise for taxpayers in states with closed policies.   
 
III.  THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN VERSUS SEALED BIDDING 
 
There is a rich and growing literature on the impact of state and 
local EDIs on various measures of economic wealth, including job 
creation, salary levels, and tax revenues.  The findings are mixed, 
however, in large part because of the empirical and research design 
challenges associated with isolating the impact of EDIs on a 
community.
74
    
While much of the existing literature concludes that EDIs destroy 
economic wealth, a growing minority of more recent studies argue that 
if used judiciously the EDI process can isolate the most beneficial 
offers.
75
  Edmiston, for example, finds that because business follows 
labor, the most effective EDIs may entice people, not firms, to 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Jarrell, Shoesmith & Robbins, supra  note 1.  
75 Timothy J. Bartik, Solving the Problem of Economic Development 
Incentives, 36 GROWTH & CHANGE 139 (2005); Michael Greenstone & Enrico 
Moretti, Bidding for Industrial Plants: Does Winning a ‘Million Dollar Plant’ 
Increase Welfare? (NBER Working Paper No. 9844, 2003), available at 
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~moretti/milliondollarplant.pdf (arguing that 
EDIs create value).     
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  Greenbaum and Bondinio explore differences in the types of 
funding mechanisms used in EDIs.
77
  They find that governments that 
focus more on attracting businesses rather than job creation tend to use 
loans rather than grants to fund EDIs, while those that face more 
significant financing barriers, surprisingly, favor grants over loans, 
even though grants typically are not repaid.  Future research into the 
impact of EDIs on wealth creation will need to control for the types of 
financing mechanisms used. 
Although the question of whether EDIs can create wealth rages 
on, there seems to be no debate about the desirability of transparency in 
the EDI bidding process.  The near-universal opinion in both the 
popular press and the academic literature is that an open bidding 
process is preferable; state and local governments should disclose the 
details of EDI bids to the public during the bidding process and hold 
hearings to allow the public to discuss, debate, and presumably even 
alter or veto the bid.
78
  An open and transparent bidding process is 
distinguishable from the broader issue of accountability, where 
recipient firms may make regular reports to the state on the status of 
any performance pre-conditions of the EDI (for example, on number of 
jobs created or retained) over the duration of the funding. 
A columnist in the Knoxville News Sentinel recently lamented, 
“Nobody, you see, is ever supposed to know anything about allocating 
state money to corporations that are considering opening or expanding 
an enterprise within Tennessee.  Not until the deal is done.  Well, 
maybe unless you’re a sworn-to-secrecy insider, privileged to know 
that which cannot be entrusted to common folk.”
79
  Texas State 
Controller Susan Combs identified a perceived flaw in the allocation of 
Texas Enterprise and Emerging Technology funds following a wide-
ranging review of the state’s job incentives programs.  The review was 
prompted after questions arose over links between contributors to 
                                                 
76 Kelly D. Edmiston, Attracting the Power Cohort to the Tenth District, 
94 ECON. REV.: FED. RES. BANK OF KAN. CITY 69 (2009). 
77 Robert Greenbaum & Daniele Bondonio, Incentivizing Economic 
Development: An Empirical Examination of the Use of Grants and Loans, 7 
S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. (forthcoming Oct. 2011). 
78 Bartik, supra note 75, at 140 (“Local decisions about incentives will be 
improved by a more democratic process with full information . . . .”). 
79 Tom Humphrey, Humphrey: Shhh! Bredesen’s $51 Million Secret,   
KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, May 16, 2010, 
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2010/may/16/shhh-bredesens-51-million-
secret/. 
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Governor Perry’s campaign and companies that had been awarded job-
creation grants under the programs.  “Due to the flexibility of the 
decision-making process, the program appears less transparent at times, 




The 2003 incentive package that brought the Scripps Research 
Institute to Florida is facing some buyer’s remorse as well.  “Nobody 
asked what $569 million could do for Florida if such a mega-subsidy 
was directed to other needy purposes . . . .  Nobody asked because 
nobody knew.  To some who think government should be more 
publicly accountable with taxpayer dollars used to lure new business, 
the secrecy of the Scripps deal barely passes the sniff test.”
81
 
Most proponents of increased disclosure base their arguments on 
philosophical grounds of equity and fairness.  They contend that 
because the state is spending the public’s money, the public has a right 
to know how its money is being spent.  Sealed bids, those known only 
to the involved parties, encourage secrecy and corruption, neither of 
which has a place in the EDI bidding process.  Under this view, state 
and local government officials have an obligation to fully disclose the 
details of the proposed EDI bid to the public, and to hold hearings to 




A. THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT FOR DISCLOSURE 
 
This paper argues that if the goal of EDIs is to create economic 
wealth, then the issue of whether the bidding process should be open or 
closed should be determined, or at least informed, by its impact on 
                                                 
80 Comptroller Urges More Openness of Job Incentive Programs, CBS 
DALL. / FORT WORTH, Dec. 23, 2010, 
http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2010/12/23/comptroller-urges-more-openness-of-job-
incentive-programs/. 
81 Robert Trigaux, Who Really Benefits From the Subsidy Game? ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 13, 2005, 
http://www.sptimes.com/2005/06/13/Columns/Who_really_benefits_f.shtml. 
82 See Bartik, supra note 75; see also Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax 
Incentives: A Status Report, 34 URB. LAW. 415 (2002); John Howe and Ingrid 
Landau, Do Investment Attraction Incentives Create Decent Jobs? A Study of 
Labour Conditions in Industry Assistant Contracts, 19 LABOR AND INDUSTRY 97 
(2009). 
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  Timothy J. Bartik, senior economist at the W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and widely regarded expert 
on EDIs, calls for greater transparency of incentives and incentive 
offers, yet he does not provide thorough economic analysis to support 
this demand.  Bartik’s reasons for greater transparency include the 
following: (1) disclosure will improve the bargaining position of 
economic developers; (2) it will promote broader public debate; (3) it 
will allow better research on incentives; and (4) it is essential for any 




An example may help illustrate the implications of Bartik’s 
reasoning.  Assume that if Company X relocates in South Carolina, 
$100 of additional economic wealth is created for society, where 
society consists of consumers, businesses, and government.  Further, 
assume that all parties concur with this figure.
85
  If South Carolina 
offered Company X an EDI package of $100 in tax rebates and other 
measures, and Company X accepted the offer, the net economic impact 
of the relocation to society would be $0 (ignoring the waste and loss of 
value associated with the mechanisms for collecting and distributing 
the tax revenues).  If South Carolina reduced its offer to $80 and 
Company X accepted, South Carolina and its citizens would be better 
off by $20.  Lastly, if South Carolina paid $120 to entice Company X, 
$20 of social economic wealth would be destroyed.   
This example enables a closer examination of Bartik’s first 
reason for transparency.  Bartik theorizes that “disclosure may . . . give 
economic developers a more accurate knowledge of what alternatives 
are open to business locations decision makers, which should improve 
the bargaining position of economic developers.  Businesses already 
know what they have been offered by different local areas, but 
                                                 
83 The authors are not aware of any academic study on the impact of 
transparency of EDI bids on economic wealth.  The studies which approach the 
issue of transparency in EDI bidding either ignore the issue of openness or 
simply conclude, without analysis and apparently on some unspoken 
philosophical grounds, that the bidding process in EDIs should be more 
transparent.  Bob Orr plainly laid out the options when he told the Greenville 
News that while transparency has the potential to drive up the price of EDI 
bids, secrecy makes it a sure thing.  See Secrecy Drives Up Cost, supra note 32. 
84 Bartik, supra note 75. 
85 Notice that if this same company were to relocate to some other state, 
instead, the impact on social value would likely be different.   
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economic developers do not.”
86
  Bartik is suggesting one of two things: 
either that the value of Company X to South Carolina is a function of 
its value to other states and that South Carolina needs to know those 
bids in order to assign value to the relocation, or that South Carolina 
knows the value of this company’s relocation but wants to pay as little 
as possible in a winning EDI bid. 
The first interpretation is not plausible for two reasons.  First, the 
value of a company to a state depends on the specific economic 
conditions in that state, not on the company’s performance in some 
other state.  Second, if every state needed to see what another state was 
offering in order to assess value, no state would be able to unilaterally 
assign value to the deal.  Specifically, if Bartik is assuming that 
officials need information on competing offers in order to determine 
value, he must explain how competing offers from other states are 
economically valid in the first place while offers from the state in 
question are not. Finally, under this interpretation of Bartik’s first 
reason for transparency, the competing states’ offers must be 
interpreted as accurate disclosures of the value of the company to those 
states.  There is an important distinction between the actual economic 
value of the relocation to a state, and the (winning) EDI bid by that 
state.  It is the difference between the two that determines the value of 
EDIs to society. 
The second, more valid interpretation of Bartik’s first reason is 
that knowledge of other offers helps the state fashion a bid that is high 
enough to win, but not so high as to “overpay” for the EDI, where 
overpayment is determined by the relationship between the actual value 
of the relocation to the state and this state’s bid.  The impact of 
transparency on the bidding process, however, remains an open 
question under Bartik’s formulation.   
Bartik’s second reason for calling for national transparency in the 
EDI bidding process is that it will promote broader public debate.  As 
economic value is clearly not determined by democratic vote, Bartik 
must be referring to public debate about the veracity of the state’s bid.  
The mechanism by which public debate may “improve” the EDI bid is 
unclear.  Unless public debate generates higher quality information 
about the relocation or supplants state officials’ deliberation with a 
superior analysis of the data, the call for public debate on the EDI 
bidding process holds little promise for improving the economic impact 
of EDIs.  If Bartik is referring to the disciplinary impact of public 
                                                 
86 Bartik, supra note 75, page 149. 
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debate against overpaying, then the relationship between transparency 
and the bidding process remains unresolved. 
Bartik’s third justification for transparency in EDIs is that it 
“allows better research on incentives.”  This seems more directed 
toward improving the impact of the incentives on economic well-being 
and wealth than on deliberately increasing transparency of the bidding 
process.
87
  Bartik implicitly assumes that incentives can in fact be 
improved, which remains an open and fairly complex empirical 
question, and that independent researchers are in a better position than 
the state to assess the impact of the EDIs on wealth.  
The last of the four reasons Bartik offers in support of EDI 
transparency is that “it is essential for any incentive regulation by the 
federal government or supranational organization.”  It appears that, in 
this instance, Bartik is referring to the transparency of the details of the 
state or local EDI programs to the federal organization, which simply 
requires direct reporting by the state to the federal body, not public 
hearings and debate.  While it is likely that the states will not 
voluntarily agree to a uniform EDI policy, this begs the question of 
whether local EDIs will be found to be unconstitutional under the 
Commerce Clause.
88
  If unconstitutional, the issue of whether public 
disclosure at the time of the bid adds value becomes moot.  However, 
in the foreseeable future, the use of local and state EDIs is very likely 
to remain widespread. 
Although Bartik’s reasons may seem compelling and intuitive, he 
does not provide an economic analysis to support his demand for 
transparency.  Since the goal of EDIs is to create economic wealth, then 
only if open bids support wealth creation should the EDI bidding 
process be open. The economics literature may provide insight into the 
potential impact on the level and distribution of wealth creation of 
sealed versus open EDI bidding processes.  Two lines of research in the 
                                                 
87 See Enrich, supra note 82.  Enrich points out that better data on costs 
and benefits could enable better analysis of the economic impact of a program.  
However, publicizing the data does not necessarily improve either the quality 
or the analysis of the data.  In fact, Enrich goes one step further, suggesting that 
toothless disclosure measures could provide political cover for continued 
escalation of the interstate subsidy competition. 
88 See Jarrell, Shoesmith & Robbins, supra note 1; Enrich, supra note 82. 
Enrich observes that most of the tax breaks offered to influence business 
location decisions appear to violate well-established Commerce Clause norms, 
and litigation challenging their constitutionality may offer the best hope of 
reversing the continuing proliferation of tax incentives.   
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economics literature are relevant: economics of search and auctions.   
 
B.  ECONOMICS OF SEARCH 
 
In the seminal work in this field, George J. Stigler, winner of the 
1982 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, explains that searching for the 
best price on a product or service creates economic wealth.
89
  A 
“search” is the process by which “[a] buyer (or seller) who wishes to 
ascertain the most favorable price . . . canvass[es] various sellers (or 
buyers) . . . .”
90
  If there was perfect information where buyers and 
sellers have full knowledge of each other and of the products or 
services being bought and sold, or if all products or services were 
identical, then search creates zero additional value.  However, if there 
is imperfect information about the parties, product, or service, or if the 
product or service varies either in its features, quality, or terms of sale, 
then search creates benefits.
91
  The benefits of search are the added 
value or revenues from a better match between supplier and consumer.  
The benefit can be as simple as finding the same good at a lower price.  
The larger the price dispersion, the greater the potential benefits of 
search,
92
 since with search one is likely to find a lower price.  Price 
dispersion, however, is a biased measure of ignorance (or “asymmetric 
information”) in the market.  Price dispersion is also due to 
heterogeneity of the buyers or sellers in the market.
93
   
Nonetheless, search costs money.  The costs of search are 
essentially the time, man-hours, and the possibility that by continuing 
to search and delaying purchase, the better deal will slip away.  The 
optimal amount of search is given by the point where the additional 
benefits of search equal its additional costs.
94
  
                                                 
89 George S. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL ECON. 213 
(1961). 
90 Id.  
91 Id. 
92 Id. 




 Research applying the economics of search to the labor market was 
awarded the 2010 Nobel Prize in Economics. THE PRIZE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES 
2010: MARKETS WITH SEARCH COSTS, ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2010/info.pdf. For a 
survey of the literature applying search costs to the labor market, see Richard 
Rogerson, Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, Search-Theoretic Models of the 
Labor Market: A Survey, 43 J. ECON. LIT. 959 (2005).  
2011] ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES 249  
 AND THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 
 OF OPEN VERSUS SEALED BIDS 
 
The costs and benefits of search may be illustrated with an 
example from the labor market.
95
  An unemployed person benefits from 
searching for the best job, one that best matches their skills and 
preferences to employers’ needs.  A good match results in an efficient, 
sustainable outcome, which creates the maximum value for society.  
The optimal search is the one that equates the additional benefits of 
search (finding a job for which the person is best suited, in a 
geographic region they prefer, that gives them the opportunity to 
advance, and other factors) to the additional costs of continuing to 
search (explicit costs of the job search such as gas, printing resumes, 
and conducting on-line searches, as well as the implicit costs of search 
such as foregone income and the psychological costs of being 
unemployed).  If the costs of search were so high that a person took the 
first job offer, there is a higher probability that the person would be a 
poor match for that job and would leave that job for a different one 
sooner.  Social welfare would decline as a result of this poor match.  
The same holds for other types of economic transactions.   In the 
case of EDIs, the buyer can be modeled as the firm and the sellers as 
the various states and counties trying to entice the firm to either 
relocate to or expand in their region.  Each state is “selling” a bundled 
good which consists of a particular labor force, infrastructure, capital 
base, climate, tax policy, and EDI offer.  These goods vary 
considerably across states and through time.  The more varied the 
goods, the higher the potential gain to the firm from search for the best 
“price,” or lowest cost.
96
  
The state with the most attractive package—the one that 
maximizes the revenues and minimizes the costs to the firm—will win 
the deal.  Part of the price the buyer pays to obtain the best deal is 
search cost.  The state has every incentive to minimize this cost to the 
firm by quickly and clearly identifying itself as a potential supplier of 
the good, and communicating the details of the EDI offer to the firm.  
Disclosing the bid to the public, however, would improve neither the 
                                                 
95
 Research applying the economics of search to the labor market was awarded 
the 2010 Nobel Prize in Economics. THE PRIZE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES 2010: 
MARKETS WITH SEARCH COSTS, ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2010/info.pdf. For a 
survey of the literature applying search costs to the labor market, see Richard 
Rogerson, Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, Search-Theoretic Models of the 
Labor Market: A Survey, 43 J. ECON. LIT. 959 (2005).  
96 See Enrich, supra note 82 (discussing conditions under which incentives 
might serve the end of matching firms with their most productive jurisdiction). 
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quantity nor the quality
97
 of the information exchanged between the 
state and the firm.  On the contrary, it may raise the cost to the 
company of relocating to or expanding in that state.  Companies often 
require that their relocation or expansion plans be kept confidential to 
protect trade secrets and confidential taxpayer information, and to 
avoid excessive real estate speculation that might drive up the costs of 
land acquisition.
98
  The financial economics literature has generated 
some evidence that may predict the impact of regulations requiring 
hearings and similar public disclosure of trade secrets and other 
innovative business plans.   
For example, in 1968, the William’s Act was amended to require 
a 20-day waiting period in tender offers and disclosure of specific 
information about how the company planned to create value.
99
  These 
amendments are analogous to requiring public hearings and open 
bidding in EDIs.  As a result of the Williams Act, bidder competition 
and the level of bids significantly increased which reduced the returns 
to the winning bidder and their incentive to invest in tender offers.  As 
expected, the overall amount of economic wealth generated by tender 
offers fell, and more of that wealth was captured by the target.  
The implications of the impact of the Williams Amendment for 
EDI policy are clear.  Opening the bidding process and requiring more 
transparency about the details of EDI bids will likely result in increased 
interstate and intrastate competition for the target firm.  When there are 
more potential locations in play and public hearings delay agreements 
and the implementation of innovative business plans, a company may 
be able to elicit larger EDI bids from hopeful candidates eager to outbid 
one another and “win” business.  This chain reaction may ultimately 
transfer more wealth (in the form of EDIs) from the chosen state to the 
target firm, thus reducing the social benefits of the incentives program.   
    
                                                 
97 See ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS AND 
TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ANY ASSET, 577 (Wiley ed., 2d 
ed. 2002). 
98 See Morgan, supra note 50; Zach Patton, Why Are Tax-Incentive Deals 
Almost Always Negotiated in Private? GOVERNING, July 31, 2008, 
http://www.governing.com/topics/economic-dev/Hush-Money.html. (In Lenoir, 
landowners who sold to Google via third-party transactions later complained 
that they would have held out for more money had they realized that they had 
such a deep-pocketed buyer.) 
99 Gregg A. Jarrell & Michael Bradley, The Economic Effects Of Federal 
And State Regulations Of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371-407 (1980). 
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C.  THE AUCTION LITERATURE 
 
An auction is a public sale where goods or services are sold to 
the highest bidder.  In economic theory, an auction refers to any set of 
trading rules for exchange.  The basic components of an auction model 
consist of a set of potential buyers (states, in the case of EDIs), the joint 
distribution of valuations for these potential buyers (how much value 
could be created by the firm in each of these states), and a reserve price 





In the context of EDIs, an auction takes place when two or more 
states bid to attract a company to its jurisdiction using tax abatements 
or similar incentives as payment.
101
  If bidders are risk-neutral, 
homogeneous, have the same information set, and bid competitively 
(rather than engage in collusion, for example), then both open and 
sealed bidding processes yield the same revenue to the firm, the same 
bidder participation, and the same winner.  This is the “revenue 
equivalence theorem.”
102
  In practice, however, these assumptions fail 
to hold, and the impact of requiring openness in the EDI bidding 
process depends on the degree to which these assumptions fail.
103
  For 
example, some research finds that open bidding, by enabling bidders to 
inspect one another’s valuations,
104
 encourages collusion between 
bidders to reduce offer prices.  Other studies find that when bidders or 
states are asymmetric (have different costs of implementing EDI 
packages, for example), the expected revenue generated to the firm and 
the expected value of the EDI program to the state may be higher or 
lower under open bidding versus closed bidding, depending on the 
nature of the asymmetry.
105
  Others find that the nature of the relevant 
information, whether common or private, determines whether open or 
                                                 
100 Kenneth Hendricks & Harry J. Paarsch, A Survey of Recent Empirical 
Work Concerning Auctions, 28 CANADIAN J. ECON. 403 (1995). 
101 See Rachel Weber, Do Better Contracts Make Better Economic 
Development Incentives? 68 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 43 (2002). 
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STUDIES 413 (2000). 
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Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions, 95 J. POL. 
ECON. 1217 (1987).   
105 See Maskin & Riley, supra note 103. 
252 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 7.2 




  However, no distinct patterns emerge.  In 
addition, much of this literature presumes a profit motive on the part of 
the participants, which is questionable in the case of state-administered 
EDI programs.  
Some evidence in the auction and game theory literature suggests 
that open bidding increases the incidence of both the “winner’s curse” 
and “adverse selection.”  By sharing information about the nature and 
specifics of the EDI bid with the public and thus with other potential 





D.  WINNER’S CURSE AND ADVERSE SELECTION 
 
The winner's curse occurs in common-value auctions with 
incomplete information.  In a common-value auction, the information 
about the auctioned item is spread among the bidders; hence, a bidder 
would modify the value of winning if the once-private information of 
opponents was made available through, for example, an open bidding 
process.  In a private-value auction, a bidder’s estimate of the value of 
winning is independent of the value placed on winning by others.   
The winner of an auction is, of course, the bidder who submits 
the highest bid.  Since the auctioned item is worth roughly the same to 
all bidders in a common-value auction, they are distinguished only by 
their respective estimates.  The winner, then, is the bidder making the 
                                                 
106 See Angel Hernando-Veciana, Information Acquisition in Auctions: 
Sealed Bids vs. Open Bids, 65 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 372 (2009) (open 
auctions induce more private information acquisition and are associated with 
improved efficiency); see also Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, On the Value 
of Competition in Procurement Auctions, 70 ECONOMETRICA 343 (2002) (the 
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Value Discovery (Indiana University, Working Paper, 2007), available at 
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107 See P. R. Milgrom & R. J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and 
Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1089 (1982) (showing that if state 
valuations are correlated, bids are higher with open bidding); Charles R. Plott, 
Laboratory Experiments in Economics: The Implications of Posted-Price 
Institutions, 232 SCI. 732 (1986) (showing that bids are higher and efficiency—
value creation—is lower with posted or open prices).  
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highest estimate.  If we assume that the average bid is accurate, then the 
highest bidder overestimates the item's value.  Thus, the auction's 
winner is likely to overpay.   
Bidders may try to avoid the winner's curse by bid shading, or 
placing a bid that is below their estimation of the value of the item for 
sale.  This increases the likelihood that they may lose out to a 
competing bidder; consequently, this may be a negative outcome if the 
bidder lacks alternative options.  The bidder has expended resources to 
woo investment, but has nothing to show for it. 
The severity of the winner's curse increases with the number of 
bidders.
108
  This is because the more bidders there are, the more likely 
it is that some of them have overestimated the firm’s value to the state.  
To the extent that open bidding encourages more competition and/or 
higher bids, the winner’s curse problem is intensified.  “Winning the 
auction is bad news to the extent that it reveals the winning bidder’s 
signal was more optimistic than that of the other bidders, and the 
greater the level of competition the worse the news associated with 
winning.”
109
  Looking at EDIs, a winning bid amid robust competition 
may suggest that the winner has overpaid, thus destroying social 
wealth.  The winner’s curse problem is also more severe in cases where 
the estimator has limited liability for valuation mistakes, as is the case 
with EDIs, as government officials are not held personally liable for 
overpayment.
110
  Ironically, some argue that open bidding and similar 




For auctions with private values, when the value of the firm to 
the state is independent of its value to other states, the winner's curse is 
less likely to arise.  Any bidding mechanism that encourages states to 
                                                 
108 See Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, 
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jobs well); see also Milgrom & Weber, supra 107 (the returns to EDIs may be 
more symbolic in that accountability measures offer protection from 
accusations that cities give away too much or too little). 
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perform a careful cost-benefit analysis of the value of attracting or 
retaining a specific firm to that state, regardless of the value other states 
may assign to that transaction, results in fair valuations and efficient 
outcomes.  Sealed bids reduce the incidence of the winner’s curse and 
its associated costs by circumventing the incentive to outbid actual or 
potential competitors. 
 
E.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: OPTIMAL BIDDING PROCESS 
 
Auctions are of specific interest to economists because they are 
explicit mechanisms, which demonstrate the way that prices are formed 
and values are assigned.
112
  There is much theoretical work on auctions 
that has been done; however, empirical work is much more limited, as 
are the conclusions on optimal bidding processes and design of 
markets.
113
   
Recent empirical research into the optimal auction process has 
had two main goals.
114
  One is to test the behavioral theories about how 
potential buyers actually bid.  If the valuations of the buyers and the 
probability law governing these valuations are known to the researcher, 
then this question is easily addressed by comparing the submitted bids 
with those predicted by the optimal open or closed bidding strategy.
115
  
Experimental or laboratory studies suffer from the problem that the 
behavior of subjects in the lab may differ from agents in the real world.  
Thus, while informative and cost-effective, experimental studies are no 
substitute for careful field work.  Field data, on the other hand, are 
drawn from diverse buyers with unknown valuations and little choice in 
the types of bidding mechanisms they use.
116
 
The second goal of empirical research on auctions is to identify 
the probability distributions governing the valuations of potential 
buyers so that their observed bids from a cross-section of auctions can 
be used to infer whether open or closed bidding was optimal.  Auction 
theory states that if the revenue generation is the same between open 
and closed bidding processes, participants will be indifferent between 
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regimes and will randomly switch between bidding mechanisms.
117
  
Yet, there are almost no instances of this type of switching in private 
industry.  The problem may be, however, that there are very few 
markets in which buyers can choose which bidding format they will 
use.  Only two relatively robust markets allow buyers to influence 
bidding format, and both involve public transactions.  One is the 




The U.S. Forest Service timber program provides a useful test 
case as it uses both open and sealed bidding, at times even randomizing 
the choice.  This market also involves heterogeneous bidders, with 
sophisticated mills bidding directly against small loggers for tracts of 
land and timber. 
Susan Athey and Jonathan Levin, professors of economics at 
Harvard & Stanford respectively, have found that with heterogeneous 
bidders, sealed bidding promotes entry by weak bidders, which, in their 
study of timber auctions, were small logging firms that lacked 
manufacturing capacity.
119
  In a sealed-bid auction, the bidders with the 
highest value—in this case, larger mills with manufacturing 
capability—have an incentive to shade their bids a bit below their true 
valuations in order to increase profits; therefore, weaker bidders can 
win despite not having the highest valuation.  This window of 
opportunity gives weaker bidders an incentive to enter sealed-bid 
auctions and may be akin to the adverse selection issue discussed 
earlier.  These results must be applied to EDIs with caution, however, 
because the bidders studied by Athey and Levin are firms with profit 
motives.  Other research on unobserved auction heterogeneity—when a 
researcher does not have access to all common information, such as the 
bidders’ cost structures—adds texture to Athey & Levin’s findings.
120
  
These studies show that differences in bidders have a significant effect 
on the auction outcome, including profits and efficiency.  Bidder costs 
and the reservation price set by the seller are higher than previously 
estimated using one-dimensional models of bidder private 
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  Small differences in modeling or inferences create 
significant differences in empirical results.  Empirical research on the 
impact of open versus closed bidding mechanisms is in its infancy, and 




IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Philosophically, it is easy to support an open EDI bidding 
process because taxpayers expect their public officials to be 
accountable for decision-making concerning government spending and 
subsidies.  But because the goal of EDIs is to maximize economic 
wealth—whether measured in terms of the number or quality of jobs 
created, land value, or tax revenues—one must look to the economic 
consequences of open versus closed bidding before concluding that 
open bidding mechanisms are better.  
 The economics literature suggests that with diverse bidders and 
imperfect information, the EDI prices paid by states with open bidding 
are significantly higher than those with sealed bids.  As a result, less 
wealth is created for states with open bidding, and more of that wealth 
is retained by the target firms, exemplifying the winner’s curse as in the 
Dell example.  
The economic costs and benefits of disclosure are especially 
complex with EDIs because such activities have one foot in private 
industry and the other in the public domain.  They involve supra-
market transactions and negotiations where the usual economic 
incentives to minimize costs and maximize value may be superseded by 
political motives, such as serving the public good and retaining political 
office.  It may very well be that if all states were open, overbidding 
would not occur, and efficient outcomes would prevail.  Such a result, 
however, would require federal intervention, likely through the 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
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